

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, General Services Office

SUBJECT : Processing of New Employees

CONFIDENTIAL NO CHANGE in Class.  
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S  
Auth: DDA Memo, 4/1/77  
DDA 1/1/77  
Date: 30 MAR 1978 By: 028

1. PROBLEM - The time consumed for training of new employees is excessive and should be shortened.

2. ASSUMPTION - That (1) the average period required for security clearance continues without change. (2) Training prerequisites remain constant in time consumed.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM - The average length of time required for processing new employees through various entrance stages to duty assignments is provided as follows:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Stage</u>	<u>Months</u>	<u>Days</u>
Personnel	Recruitment and Screening	1	15
I&S	Security Clearance	4	
Medical	Physical Examination		1
Personnel and Duty Office	Preparation of Papers and		
	Introductory Process		1
I&S and Personnel	Security Indoctrination		1
Relations			
Training	Orientation Processes (Clerical)		4
	BIC/SUP	1	12
Total		6	34

4. DISCUSSION - The time consumed in processing new employees to duty status is excessive and should be shortened if such time exceeds the period of normal requirements. The time consumed for training prerequisites exceeds the period of normal requirements and, thus, is excessive and should be shortened. Normally, the time differential between the development of organizational plans and the implementation of procedures for new administrative programs on the operational or support levels is equivalent to the entrance period of normal requirements such as, recruitment, screening, security clearance, physical examination and security indoctrination of new employees as necessary to obtain essential skills. Recently, this entrance period has been lengthened by the addition of new orientation processes and training prerequisites and, thus, is out of proportion for effective planning and administration i.e. by virtue of the abnormal amount of time consumed which currently extends from seven months to a year. How can the agency afford the risk of deferring the implementation of planned programs for such length of time? Many contingencies might arise in such period to alter the intent of the planning in relation to the purpose of recruitment. The original concept thereof may be forgotten, changed or nullified through other considerations. Also, the new employees may have to be assigned to other duties not necessarily in keeping with the skills for which they were recruited.

The value of proper indoctrination of new employees through the medium of special orientation and training processes is fully recognized and should not be disturbed in substance. Similarly, the value of full security clearance and indoctrination is readily apparent as based on past experience. However, consideration

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for private reading preliminary to class attendance and thus reducing the class work to shorter periods for questions and explanations. Consideration might also be given to the feasibility of (a) breaking the training requirements into two parts; one half prior to full security clearance and the other, subsequent thereto and (b) opening the security barriers at the "secret" stage to permit new employees to enter on duty and attend the first half of the training period prior to full security clearance. Selection of the new employees to receive such training may be predetermined by known experience factors in security screening such as, name check with no derogatory information and polygraph. Before entering the training period, new employees should be required to execute agreements respectively to abide by the final security determinations with respect to entrance on duty. The security risk under this plan is not necessarily as great as might obtain through the hundreds of former CIA employees who have knowledge of many sensitive details of the agency.

5. CONCLUSION - The solution to the problem rests in the need of an adjustment between security and training requirements with respect to the amount of time consumed.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED - To this end, it is recommended that (1) applicants reaching the "secret" stage in security clearance be permitted to enter on duty and attend training indoctrination courses based on the application of predetermined experience factors in security screening and (2) the training indoctrination period be divided into two parts and applied as feasible from the methods suggested above.

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Chief, General Services Office

CONCURRENCES:

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ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Approved (disapproved), exceptions, if any.

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Deputy Director (Administration)

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